works, and to destroy the drug supply at its source of production.
"The logic is simple," Bush said in a May 1988 campaign speech, "The cheapest and safest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source....We need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown and take out labs wherever they exist." For more than a decade the main foreign targets in the war on drugs have been the Andean cocaine-producing countries.
The U.S. drug war there has been built on the twin components of law enforcement and economic assistance. The enforcement component seeks to cut supply by eradicating coca crops, destroying processing laboratories, blocking the transport of processing chemicals, and interdicting drug shipments. Traffickers are to be arrested and prosecuted, their assets seized, and their networks dismantled.
Past U.S. drug control efforts emphasized aid to Andean civilian law enforcement agencies and judiciaries. Meager results led to a search for ways to increase enforcement capabilities; an early step was to "militarize" the police. Beginning in 1983, the United States helped establish special counternarcotics units in Bolivia and Peru-paramilitary police squads later trained by U.S. Special Forces personnel. When this strategy proved ineffective, U.S. narcotics officials turned to Andean militaries, backed by U.S. equipment and training, to do the job.
Law enforcement has been coupled with economic assistance. A 1990 report by the Office of National Drug Control Policy emphasizes that "economic strategies and resources are required to provide the general conditions for a healthy and viable legal economy throughout the region as well as provide viable alternatives for those currently engaged in illicit U.S. counternarcotics strategies have not only failed to significantly reduce supply but have been costly to the region and to other American interests there. U.S. aid has allied the United States with corrupt and brutal security forces in the region. Peru has either topped or run second on the United Nations' list of forced "disappearances" for the past five years; its military was condemned by the U.S. State Department's 1990 Country Report for "widespread and egregious human rights violations." Aiding such security forces further strengthens historically antidemocratic institutions against fragile civilian governments and undermines the interests North Americans share with the people of the Andes in promoting democracy.
The Andean Initiative
Despite the record of supply-reduction failures and damaging consequences for democracy and human rights, the Bush administration's response has been escalation, not reconsideration. Interpreting past failure as a consequence of inadequate funding coupled with insufficient local political will and institutional capacity, the administration is implementing a "new and improved" supply-reduction strategy. The president's Andean Initiative provides unprecedented levels of U.S. aid for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru to escalate enforcement and economic assistance efforts.
The major shift from past antidrug efforts is the dramatic extension of militarization: The United States has signed separate military assistance pacts with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, assigning a leading role to their respective military forces in the war on drugs and committing extensive U.S. assistance. The militarization of the drug war also requires a significantly expanded training role for the U.S. Defense Department, and American advisers have already been sent to the region.2 In Peru, where the administration has concluded that the Shining Path guerrillas are impeding drug enforcement, the United States will support counterinsurgency.
Once Andean governments implement this militarized enforcement strategy, significant economic assistance will follow. Projected to comprise about half of the $2.2 billion designated for the region, most of this aid is targeted at balance-of-payments support, not alternative development programs. The governments of Bolivia and Peru publicly resisted initial American efforts to draw their militaries into the drug control campaign, yet their desperate need for economic help has given them little choice but to sign the antidrug accords.
Will the escalation succeed? Preliminary evidence indicates a continuation of previous trends: increased success in terms of crops eradicated, labs destroyed, and traffickers arrested, but little or no impact on overall levels of supply. Official reports of failure to achieve real supply reductions continue to mount. The State Missing: Official Will and Capability U.S. drug strategists recognize that these trends will not be reversed unless Andean governments and security forces acquire the capability and will to fight the U.S. drug war. "Strengthening political will and institutional capability," notes the 1990 report of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, "is a requisite for all further [counternarcotics] actions" in the Andean region. Andean militaries and police are presently no match for narco-trafficking organizations operating transnationally and backed by private armies, advanced weaponry, and highly sophisticated intelligence systems. Security forces in the region are further hamstrung by operational inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
A November 1989 raid on the Bolivian town of San Ram6n, touted by the U.S. embassy as "the largest counternarcotics enforcement operation in recent times," is a case in point. The raid was compromised by a tip-off; the targeted traffickers fled the site hours before the operation. Less than five kilos of cocaine were seized. The 20 Bolivians detained during the raid were released for lack of evidence, and the cost of the operation was more than $100,000.
Countless examples of inefficiency and mismanagement led the DEA in a December 1989 internal review to emphasize the need for "institution-building": The reasons for the lack of Andean commitment to the U.S. drug war are not hard to identify. The Andean economic and political context makes it rational for political leaders, military and law enforcement officials, and countless peasant producers to follow strategies at odds with American counternarcotics objectives. The limits on U.S. ability to create the Andean will to fight America's drug war may be far greater than even the most pragmatic U.S. drug strategists have calculated. governments act in accordance with U.S. strategy. They fail to understand the systemic character of the problem: Any U.S. drug strategy designed to significantly reduce the supply of cocaine at its source threatens the immediate economic viability of Andean countries and the political survival of Andean leaders.
The primary concerns of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori and Bolivian President
Certainly, Andean governments share an interest in receiving U.S. aid and support: Offering millions of dollars in desperately needed aid in return for promises to fight the drug war, not surprisingly, has generated formal commitments and varying levels of cooperation from each of the Andean countries. But the lack of real commitment to U.S. antidrug objectives suggests that only those components of the drug policy that serve existing local interests-such as economic assistance and counterinsurgency support-will be actively pursued.
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A senior officer in Peru earns about $240 a month. It should therefore be no surprise that officers now bribe their superiors to get assigned to coca-producing zones once avoided at all costs.
Corruption becomes more insidious, however, when elements of an institution are complicit in the traffic itself, and the institution acts as a shield against individual accountability. In Peru, according to U.S. Special Forces commander Colonel Robert Jacobelly, "We know as a fact that the Army gets payments for letting traffickers use airstrips."
Bank records located after the capture and killing of Colombian trafficker Jos6 Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha revealed that he had provided multimillion-dollar payoffs to entire brigades of the Colombian army. In one well-known 1983 case, a Colombian special forces company helped relocate an entire cocaine-processing operation that was threatened by guerrilla attacks. The operation took almost a month and involved nearly 50 army personnel, including six officers; each was paid between $500 and $2,500 by the traffickers. Asked why he did not act to seize the cocaine laboratory, the chief of staff of the Colombian Seventh Brigade responded that "it is not the mission" of the army to fight drugs but rather to battle insurgents.
Corruption reaches its most dangerous form when national leaders use the power of the state to further personal stakes in the drug trade. Although Panama's Manuel Antonio Noriega provides the most notorious example of state-level drug corruption, one of the Andean nations has had its own drug dictator. Andean expert Gustavo Gorriti testified before Congress that the 1980-81 regime of Luis Garcia Meza in Bolivia "was without doubt the most important case in which political power--the control of a country--was used to further, protect, and engage in narcotics trafficking."
Unless the corruption deeply embedded in the government, police, and military can be addressed, many of the very agents on which the United States relies to carry out its strategy will subvert the U.S. drug war in pursuit of personal and institutional interests in the drug 118. trade. The United States has distressingly little leverage in tempering this problem. The United States can and on occasion has secured the removal of individual officials accused of corruption. But such steps are merely temporizing measures perceived by Andean leaders as necessary to secure continued U.S. assistance. They do not address the systemic problem of drugrelated corruption: the high profits of the drug trade. Government salaries cannot compete with traffickers' bribes. Moreover, an intensified antinarcotics campaign heightens the risks involved in the drug trade, thereby increasing the need for traffickers to rely on bribes and payoffs. The more aggressive the counternarcotics campaign, the greater the corruption and the higher the institutional stakes in the drug trade-and in subverting the U.S. drug war.
Narcotics officials acknowledge that problems such as corruption pose tremendous obstacles to the success of U.S. policy. As a December 1989 DEA report observes, "The 'moral' factors of corruption and national will are more complex [than the 'physical' factors of training and equipment], requiring progress in tangible and intangible areas beyond the scope of law enforcement." Yet the administration's policy rests on the assumption that focusing on the "physical" aspects will improve the "moral" factors. As the 1990 report of the Office of National Drug Control Policy stated, "increased military and law enforcement capability...can strengthen a country's national will to initiate and sustain counternarcotics programs." In fact, the effect can be precisely the opposite: An increased capability can make corruption even more profitable-and institutional will to fight drugs even more elusive.
The Logic of Peasant Production
The success of the U.S. drug strategy is conditioned not only on the will and ability of political elites and institutions, but on the actions of vast segments of the Andean population engaged in the cocaine economy. The United States and the Andean governments must convince hundreds of thousands of people to stop growing, processing, and shipping coca products. The current strategy relies on the same "carrot and stick" approach to peasant 119. production that has underpinned previously unsuccessful U.S. efforts in the region.
The United States seeks to provide peasants with "carrots," through incentives to substitute other crops for coca, despite its profitability. The program of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) offers macro-level economic assistance, alternative development and income substitution, narcotics awareness and education, and administration of justice. Funds are used, for example, to identify potential new crops and to provide seeds for distribution. But U.S. officials concede the failure of Andean crop substitution programs: In Peru, for example, $25 million has been invested in the Upper Huallaga Valley over a decade, with no signs of success. Representative Lawrence Smith (D-Florida) stated flatly, "We have put a lot of money into crop substitution and it has gone absolutely nowhere."
The enforcement "stick" seeks to raise the risks and costs of illegal coca growing and processing activities through crop eradication, interdiction of coca products, and destruction of processing labs. Yet these tactics have failed to stem the increase in the overall coca supply. Despite periodic price swings, the profits to be gained from growing, processing, and transporting coca products have remained far higher than alternative economic pursuits.
The U.S. response to this poor record has been, once again, to change the emphasis but escalate the strategy. In recent years U.S. drug strategists have largely abandoned the difficult and time-consuming process of forcible manual eradication of coca crops, for example, in favor of coca seedbed destruction and "voluntary" eradication programs. The United States has set its sights on increased lab destruction rather than targeting primitive processing pits. Rhe- encourages the spread of coca production, not only within the current producing countries but across borders: DEA agents acknowledge the increasing spread of cocaine processing and trafficking to Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
The Counterinsurgency Parallel
What debate there is in Washington over drug policy is proceeding in predictable ways. Conservative advocates of the use of force push for greater spending on enforcement and increased militarization. More moderate voices insist that economic development, crop substitution, and technical assistance would be more effective-and less destructive to human life and political democracy. The most serious debates are over the mix and levels of U.S. aid targeted for enforcement versus economic assistance.
But neither of these approaches, nor any mixture of them, can succeed, given that the major actors in the region are not only uncommitted to the U.S. drug war but have both rational and venal interests in thwarting it. Administration officials continue to argue that more arms, more training, and more technical assistance will solve the problem. If challenged, they drag out the false pragmatism of those unable to defend a failed policy through reasoned argument: "We can't know that the policy won't work until we try harder." But we do not have to wait for more evidence from the Andean drug war front: The current counternarcotics strategy is built on the same flawed premises as U.S. counterinsurgency strategies that have so often foundered on repeated failures to create the needed will and capability among local elites and populations.
Counterinsurgency (CI) and counternarcotics (CN) strategies are distinct. The first aims to defeat a guerrilla movement seeking support among the peasant population; the second aims to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers who offer lucrative markets for the peasants. There are, however, important and troubling parallels between CI's military strategies for defeating guerrillas through search and destroy missions and wars of attrition, and the increasing use of such "low intensity conflict" against drug traffickers. And just as CI strategists seek to woo 122. peasants away from the guerrillas by winning their "hearts and minds" through local development projects, land reform, and technical assistance, so too do CN strategists look to economic reforms and "civic action" programs to lure peasants away from profitable coca production. Not surprisingly, counternarcotics policy planners at the U.S. Southern Command and elsewhere have self-consciously borrowed from counterinsurgency theory and experience.
But what is most important here is the common understanding counterinsurgency strategists share with today's counternarcotics planners: If the strategy is to work, governments must have the ability and will to carry out the military and reform strategies, and peasants must have the will and ability to support the government and reject the insurgents (or traffickers). Efforts to build up local institutions to fight the U.S. drug war parallel the process earlier CI strategists called "nation-building": attempts to create institutions with funds for judicial and electoral reform, economic development, and administrative training. Military institution building meant training in intelligence, operations, and human rights. But as Michael Shafer has demonstrated in his 1988 counterinsurgency study Deadly Paradigms, limited success in improving operational efficiency did not translate into effectiveness because the will to carry out the U.S. CI strategy was absent and could not be created. Also, government officials often had other, more important interests that made it rational for them to act contrary to U.S. objectives. U.S. training, for example, unquestionably created more skillful and efficient government administrators. But corruption was often so systemic that these skills were used to protect "bought" positions and reap personal profit. institutional accountability that could end the widespread corruption by which they profited.
Despite the evidence, U.S. strategists nevertheless clung to the idea that proper training could "create in them an awareness of the political process of nation-building" and make them "advocates of democracy and agents for carrying forward the developmental process," according to a key 1962 Kennedy administration policy paper. When this failed, the ultimate myth was that the United States could use the leverage of U.S. aid to force change. As this analysis put it, governments facing expulsion "have no practical alternative to accepting the U.S. recommendations, particularly if specific reforms become prerequisites to the continuance of U.S. aid." But time and again this assessment has proven wrong. U.S. leverage is limited as long as these militaries know that defeating the insurgency (and, increasingly, winning the drug war) is considered a vital national security matter and that Washington is therefore unlikely to pull the aid plug.
The experience of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts thus provides an instructive critique of current drug war strategy. The lesson is not the impossibility of defeating insurgents: Insurgents have been defeated by governments that were able and willing to make reforms and thus gain the support of the population-and by governments and militaries with the will and ability to sufficiently brutalize and repress their populations to contain (even if temporarily) local insurgent movements. The real lesson is that the local capability and will to conduct an effective strategy cannot be manufactured by the United States where they do not exist. Indeed, winning the commitment of local governments and militaries to fight the drug trade by which so many benefit can only be more difficult than securing the commitment of local elites to fight insurgents who threaten their existence. To admit the uncomfortable truth that no policy to reduce supply at the source of production can work without the full commitment of local actors, and that this commitment cannot be created by the United States, is to acknowledge that a supply-side strategy abroad cannot succeed in solving the problems of drug abuse and violence at home. Few drug officials would risk the budgets of their agencies, let alone their jobs, to argue that what they are doing is destined to fail. Perhaps most important, few politicians would be willing to risk being labeled "soft" on drugs or to surrender the convenience of blaming a foreign enemy.
To overcome this politics of denial and approach a solution to the drug problem, we must begin a real debate. The first step would be to force the Bush administration to confront the fatal flaws in its supply-reduction strategy. The will and ability of Andean governments, militaries, police, and peasants to wage the U.S. drug war do not exist, and years of U.S. attempts have failed to create them. Arms, training, and money may make local security forces more efficient, but the historical record is clear:
Efficiency is not the same as effectiveness; better armed and trained security forces are not necessarily less corrupt or more respectful of human rights-or more capable of reducing the drug supply. The administration's "evidence" of success-the number of labs destroyed or tons of cocaine seized-must be exposed as the misleading "body counts" of the drug war.
Policymakers must, finally, confront the analysis of critics such as RAND economist Peter Reuter, who has demonstrated the futility of 126. source-country efforts by showing that there is little relationship between supply reduction in the Andes and demand reduction at home: "Even if source country governments are willing to support them," Reuter testified before Congress in October 1989, "these programs offer little prospect for substantially affecting U.S. cocaine problems." Because the largest portion of the price on the street is added on after the drug enters the United States, Reuter has shown, even an inconceivable 50 per cent reduction in Andean supply would have only a negligible impact on domestic street prices. Even an overwhelmingly successful U.S. Andean strategy would thus contribute little to the ultimate aim of U.S. policy-raising cocaine prices and reducing consumption in North America.
The truth would be a difficult pill for policymakers to swallow: There is no Andean supplyreduction strategy that can significantly lower the demand for drugs at home. The supplyreduction policy defies both the logic of the market and the rational interests of local governments and populations. To continue to frame the central issue as how to reduce the foreign supply at the source is to mistake the means for the end and to virtually guarantee continued failure. In other words, the drug problem should be largely in the domain of domestic policy, not foreign policy.
The required shift in drug policy does not mean abandoning the Andes. The United States can take immediate actions to end practices that actually fuel the drug trade: Lax export controls, for example, make the United States the source of a significant proportion of the chemicals used for the processing of cocaine and the majority of the arms used by Andean drug traffickers.
Further, the United States has important interests in the Andes, such as strengthening fragile democracies, encouraging equitable growth and development, and discouraging violence and human rights abuses. If American policymakers were not obsessed with drugsupply reduction, political space would be created for effective policies that genuinely serve U.S. and regional interests. Andean leaders have requested and deserve assistance in 127. strengthening judicial and other institutions threatened by the vast power of the drug cartels-even though such assistance may not reduce the cocaine supply to the United States. The economic development assistance needed to provide immediate relief in the Andes should not be conditioned on acceptance of military assistance or "progress" in the U.S. drug war.
Such foreign policies, however, cannot be allowed to obscure the focus of U.S. national concern with drug abuse, addiction, and violence. The central goals of drug policy are to reduce domestic drug consumption and curb drug-related violence. It is wasteful and inhumane to devote millions of antidrug dollars to Andean militaries when so many addicts in the United States who seek help are turned away from treatment centers for lack of space. U.S. drug policy must finally confront the hard fact that many drug dealers and users will not "just say no" to drugs unless they have something better to say "yes" to, such as a decent job, a decent school, and a chance for a decent life. Aid for the underdeveloped territories in American inner cities is desperately needed to alleviate the conditions that make drug abuse and dealing so compelling.
The problems of drug abuse and drug dealing suggest the need for a domestic policy of treatment, education, and urban development. Such a policy cannot take shape without much debate and discussion among community leaders, health officials, and policymakers. And this new dialogue cannot even begin until the United States abandons its foolish and costly obsession with solving the nation's drug problem in the distant jungles of South America.
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